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The subject of this volume is a passage of approximately 90 lines from the *Nyāyamañjarī*, a work of the classical Indian philosopher Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (fl. 9th c CE). The passage concerns the Buddhist theory of *apoha* (exclusion), according to which concepts and word-meanings function by excluding what is other than the intended content. Jayanta is not himself a Buddhist, and he rejects the *apoha* theory, but in the passage in question he first presents the objections to the theory raised by another opponent, Kumārila (8th c. CE), and then gives responses to these objections attributable to the Buddhist thinkers Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara. The volume consists of a new editing of the passage, a translation, and a series of essays on the controversy over the *apoha* theory.

Those not already familiar with the doctrine of *apoha* may well wonder why an entire volume should be devoted to discussing the seemingly obvious point that, e.g. the content of *blue* is determined by what remains when *yellow*, *red*, *green* and the like have been excluded. The view is, after all, widely shared in semantics that the extension of a kind term is determined through differentiation from a contrast-class. Here is one way of understanding the significance of this Buddhist theory. Buddhist epistemologists (members of the school of Dignāga) claim that there are two basic ways of coming to have veridical cognitions: directly, through perception, or indirectly, by inference. If I were seeking to warm myself, I might come to know of a nearby fire by seeing its flames or feeling its heat; or I might come to know of a distant fire I cannot perceive by seeing smoke and recollecting that smoke is caused by fire. The second method is indirect not only because it goes by way of the smoke that I directly cognize, but also because what it makes me cognizant of is not the particular fire causing the smoke, but an abstract 'fire-in-general'. It is nothing peculiar to that distant fire itself that brings about my cognition, but rather something that that fire shares with all other fires: the universal *fireness* or 'being fiery'. What I know from seeing smoke is that there is *something* over there that is inhered in by fireness

At least this is a natural way to analyze the inferential cognition; it is how members of the Nyāya school like Jayanta see things. And because for them the distant fire really does have fireness in it, my inference can have as its object precisely the particular fire that I would perceive were I closer. A universal such as fireness is an ontologically queer thing, though: eternal, one but wholly present in many distinct places simultaneously, apparently known only through its instantiations, etc. Buddhists reject Nyāya's realism about universals; they are nominalists, holding that only momentary particulars are strictly speaking real. The upshot is that what I *conceive* when I perform the inference from seen smoke is not the same thing as what someone near that fire *perceives*. The former is a conceptual construction, the latter a concrete particular.

The ontological scruples at work here create grave epistemological and semantic difficulties for Buddhist epistemologists. If the object known by inference is a mere conceptual construction and not the concrete particular that brings about real effects (such as the heat we feel), how can inference ever lead to successful practice, like warming myself before that distant fire? For that matter, when I see a fire in the distance, how can my cognition motivate me to move in its direction in order to get warm? Such understanding requires that I conceive what I now see as a case of *fire*, something that in my past experience has been connected with perceiving warmth. This involves bringing the object of my perception under a certain mode of conceptualization. And if there is nothing like fireness in that concrete particular, how can this conceptualization be justified?

The *apoha* theorist's answer is that while there is no fireness in what I perceive, this particular does share something with those other entities thought of as cases of fire: not being non-fire. That is, the concept *fire* picks out all and only those entities that are excluded by the class of instances of non-fire. One will then want to know what it is in virtue of which the latter class is determined: if there is nothing positive that is shared by all instances of fire, what could possibly make occurrences of water or earth count as cases of non-fire? (This is what is known as the problem of circularity or mutual dependence.) Dharmakīrti responds that water and the like count as non-fire precisely because they fail to satisfy the desire for warmth. The point is that our taking the many fires as sharing a common nature is the result of a particular set of interests. It is because we humans have a need for warmth that we come to see the many unique particulars as all alike in respect of being fiery. Their forming a kind results from the construction of a concept that overlooks their mutual distinctness in the interest of achieving cognitive economy, given our species-specific needs. Nowadays we are accustomed to the scientific realist's claim that there is in nature nothing like the colors we think we see, that there are only different

wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation. The Buddhist nominalist claim is much more radical: Not only are there strictly speaking no colors, there are no wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation either. There are only those distinct events that are usefully thought of as being electromagnetic radiation of wavelength *x*. And 'usefully' is to be understood as relative to creatures like us. All conceptualization falsifies the ultimate nature of reality.

The Indian dispute over the *apoha* theory starts here. It is generally agreed that if perception is to guide behavior, the perceived object must be seen as a particular instance of a general kind. Seeing a pot won't help solve the problem of where to store the rice if what is seen is not seen as falling under the concept *pot*. The realist Naiyāyika has no problem accounting for this. Given that the pot is inhered in by potness, sensory contact with a pot gives rise first to perception of the pot and then awareness of what is perceived as *a pot*, a member of the *pot* kind. For Nyāya, the perceptual process has two stages: first an unconceptualized bare awareness of the object, followed by a conceptual cognition whose structure is: *this as inhered in by potness*. Both elements involved in this judgment have recognized places in the Nyāya ontology: the pot as a substance, potness as a universal. Dignāga and Dharmakīrti give superficially similar accounts of the cognitive process. Seeing a pot, and having learned the convention for use of 'pot', one forms the judgment 'This is a pot'. The difficulty is that in place of a real potness, there is just the constructed 'not non-pot' to account for the transition from the first state to the second. And since conceptual constructions are not real, and the perceptual process requires real entities to serve as causal relata, the object of perception can only be a mere *this*, a pure particular. It cannot be a particular qualified by not being non-pot. In the eyes of the realist, the *apoha* theory cannot explain the transition from the first to the second stage of perceptual cognition. They cannot explain how perception can guide behavior.

This is but one of the many difficulties posed by Jayanta in the first part of the *apoha* passage from *Nyāyamañjarī* that is the subject of this volume. As the excellent translation of Kei Kataoka and Alex Watson brings out, this part of the passage proceeds on the assumption that the exclusions that are said to be denoted by words must be somehow findable in the world as it is prior to our conceptualization. If this were true, the problem might be solved. But an exclusion is an absence, and absences require substrates. The not being non-cow is what Naiyāyikas call a mutual absence (*anyonyābhāva*), the distinctness of something from something else. As such, this distinctness must qualify some entity or other. What, then, is the substrate of the absence of non-cow that is said to be the meaning of 'cow'? It cannot be the infinitely many particulars that are cows, since meanings must be graspable by the finite minds of language

users, and grasping an absence requires grasping its substrate. Nor can it be the aggregate of those many particulars. Buddhists are mereological nihilists: They deny the existence of aggregates as entities existing over and above their constituents. And of course if it were the nature shared by all those things that are cows, we would be back to positing universals like cowness. Other problems are brought up as well. For instance, if the meaning of 'cow' is determined by the extension of 'non-cow', and the meaning of 'horse' is determined by the extension of 'non-horse', then since these two extensions almost completely overlap (horses make up just a tiny proportion of the infinitely many things that are not cows, and vice versa), 'cow' and 'horse' should be near-synonyms.

The second part of the *Nyāyamañjarī* passage gives Buddhist responses to the objections raised in the first part. Jayanta's Buddhist reply begins by rejecting the assumption that the relevant exclusions are findable in the world as it is independently of our mental activity. Two alternatives are then mentioned. The first is that what is called an exclusion is actually a mental image that functions in such a way as to apply only to the entities not in the class of the excluded entities. This may be understood as the inverse of Locke's doctrine of abstract ideas. Where Locke thought we arrive at a kind-concept like *cow* by forming an image that abstracts away from the peculiarities of individual cows (white, brindled, etc.) and retains only the common features (e.g. having a dewlap), this view has the image formed by excluding the features of the non-cows. The translators attribute this view to Dharmakīrti, although it may be argued that this is mistaken. (As Kataoka points out in his essay (241), Dharmakīrti merely identifies an exclusion as the act of excluding; the mental image view is, however, clearly expressed by Śāntarakṣita). Jayanta's Buddhist quickly rejects this view in favor of a second possibility, that an *apoha* is neither something mind-independent nor a mental image superimposed on extra-mental reality (is 'neither without nor within'). This immediately raises the question how there might be something that is neither extra-mental nor mental in nature, given that any existent must be one or the other. If an exclusion is to be found neither in the external world nor in the mind, what might it possibly be like?

Several contributors tackle this question. In her essay, Pascale Hugon investigates the following objection to Dharmottara's view: If an *apoha* is not distinct from the extra-mental reals it denotes, then conceptual cognition and perception have the same object, contrary to Dignāga's foundational tenet. Her defense of the Buddhist view turns on the point that the notion of what is excluded by an *apoha* is ambiguous: it might be understood as the real, causally efficacious particulars involved in perception, or it might instead be taken as a pseudo-particular that is conceptually constructed. Hugon takes the latter reading to be

what the Buddhist intends, in which case the objection commits the fallacy of equivocation. What this leaves unanswered, however, is why conceptual cognition should lead to successful practice if its object is a mere fabrication. Kataoka, in his essay, has Dharmottara rejecting both the idea that an *apoha* is a mental image, and that it is something superimposed on the real particulars. Instead it is a mere fabrication. But here too the efficacy of conceptual cognition remains unexplained. McAllister's essay takes up the related question of how perceptual judgments, such as 'This is a pot', are arrived at. (The reader who is not already familiar with the *apoha* theory would do well to start with this essay, which provides a succinct and eminently lucid account of the theory's motivation and its different formulations.) As McAllister sees it, for Dharmottara the object of a perceptual judgment, the 'a pot', results from a process occurring over at least two moments. While this may be important, it once again fails to explain how something that is merely fabricated could play a role in fruitful conduct.

There is, though, a possibility that may have been overlooked here: that the 'neither-nor' at work in this claim that exclusions are 'neither without nor within' is the same as the one at work in the classical Buddhist *catuṣkoṭi* or tetralemma, where all four options are denied. In the tetralemma device, what allows one to reject all four logical possibilities is that the negation used in their rejection is non-implicative or verbally bound negation (*prasajya pratiṣedha*). To reject a statement using this sort of negation is not to commit to there being any positive characterization of the matter; it may instead be that the question at issue is ill-formed. Given the illegitimacy of the question 'What color is π?', to deny that π is green is not to commit to its being red or blue or yellow. That this might be what is going on in the denial that exclusion is either extra-mental or mental is hinted at when the Buddhist says that exclusion is not ultimately (*pāramārthikī*) real. What this may suggest is that while the excluded entities are deemed ultimately real, the conceptual construction that is an *apoha* is merely conventionally real. This is how Dharmottara seems to have seen the matter: this may be what he is getting at when he says that conceptualization is visible only in a sequence of successive cognitions, not in the individual cognitions themselves. The point would then be that while the object of a perceptual cognition is ultimately real, the object of inference or perceptual judgment is only conventionally real (a 'fabrication'), and so cannot be said to be ultimately identical with or distinct from the ultimately real particulars. Since conventionally real entities reductively supervene on entities that are ultimately real, the efficacy of conceptual cognitions can be accounted for in terms of the causal powers of the ultimately real particulars that are their supervenience base. And given semantic insulation between the ultimate and conventional domains of discourse, the problem of bringing the two kinds of object into relation (the problem exploited

by the 'neither identical nor distinct' argument for mereological nihilism) is avoided.

This volume contains, in addition to the translation and the essays by Hugon, Kataoka and McAllister, four other essays. There is a piece by Hideyo Ogawa on Dignāga's understanding of the semantic relation between qualifier and qualificand (as in the expression 'blue lotus'), and its relation to the semantic theory of the Grammarian Bhartṛhari. An essay by Kensho Okada examines the early commentator Śākyabuddhi's answer to the question whether what is grasped in linguistic cognition is positive or negative in nature. Hisataka Ishida's essay examines the dedicatory verse of Dharmottara's *Apohaprakaraṇa*, finding in it some clues as to Dharmottara's understanding of *apoha*. And a piece by Elisa Freschi and Artemij Keidan investigates what Jayanta may have understood by 'meaning'. Like the other essays in the volume, each of these expands our knowledge of this important chapter in Indian epistemology and philosophy of language. But there are also some difficulties that it would be remiss of a reviewer to not point out.

First there is the matter of symbols. Given the level of abstraction at which a discussion of the *apoha* theory must operate, it is natural for an explicator to use symbols to try to capture important relationships. But given that the same symbols are already used in a variety of different ways in different disciplines, it is important that they be carefully defined when first introduced. In the notes to their translation, Kataoka and Watson explain their use of the arrow and double arrow, which is useful given that these signs are used quite differently in symbolic logic. Ogawa, on the other hand, does not explain how he uses (104) the arrow ('→') and tilde ('~'). From context it is clear that by the arrow he means the denotation relation, but the tilde is ordinarily used to express sentential negation, an operation that can only be performed on complete sentences. Given that his 'W' and 'M' are meant to stand for 'word' and 'meaning' respectively, his '~W' and '~M' simply make no sense. The sentence 'It is not the case that "pot"' is meaningless. There is a related difficulty with Kataoka and Watson's use of the double arrow, which they introduce as signifying 'the relation of contradiction between two things that are mutually opposed' (36). While two *entities* may be said to be mutually opposed, only *statements* may be contradictories. Finally, Freschi and Keidan use both an arrow and a double arrow to indicate what they call (without further explanation) 'necessary links' (281). While it is not always easy to impose uniform usage across a group of scholars, doing so in a matter like this can be important.

Ogawa's essay also ends with the rather surprising claim that Dignāga's formulation of the *apoha* theory does not have the fault of circularity. As we saw earlier, the circularity objection starts from the point that in order to know the

referent of 'cow' one must be able to discern the non-cows, but to know which are those, in turn, one must know which are the cows. Avoiding this fault is, of course, a chief desideratum for any formulation of the *apoha* theory. But Ogawa has not, as far as I was able to tell, explained how Dignāga avoids it. He tells us that what is communicated by an utterance of 'cow' is the image of a cow (146). Other contributors deny that Dignāga's formulation of the theory involved appeal to mental images, and it would have been helpful to see this disagreement addressed somewhere. More importantly, though, it is not at all clear how circularity is thereby avoided. Someone who hears an utterance of 'cow' has, we are told, the right sort of image produced in them because 'the word is not used to convey other meanings … denoted by other words' (146). So the image produced is not one produced by 'horse' or 'elephant'. But how does one know that the image corresponding to 'cow' differs from that corresponding to 'horse'? Is it that the images present themselves as intrinsically dissimilar, while the images in the minds of speaker and hearer are intrinsically similar in the case of a 'cow' utterance? But similarity and dissimilarity depend on there being real universals, so this road is not open to the nominalist. Dharmakīrti is explicit on there being no real resemblances among the ultimate particulars, and there is no evidence that Dignāga thought otherwise. If resemblance is, as Dharmakīrti suggests, itself a conceptual construction, then the seeming similarities and dissimilarities among mental images cannot explain how perceptual judgments can lead to successful conduct. When told to fetch a cow, how does one know not to fetch a horse?

Freschi and Keidan begin their essay with a plea for greater openness on the part of philologists toward current work in other disciplines. Their point is well taken. Our understanding of classical Indian texts is often considerably enhanced by collaborative investigations, with philologists working in concert with scholars trained in relevant disciplines like philosophy, linguistics, logic and the like. But then care must be taken to use relevant technical terminology (not just symbols) in appropriate ways. For instance, there is a distinction to be drawn between lexical items such as terms, on the one hand, and syntactically complete statement-making sentences on the other. It is only the latter sorts of linguistic entities that may be said to have truth-values and propositional content. Yet Freschi and Keidan appear to attribute truth-values and propositional content to terms as well (268). The word 'cow' is neither true nor false, and its utterance does not express a proposition. There is also a problem with their use of the term 'quality' to translate *guṇa*. In discussing the term *vṛtti* or 'occurrence' they say that Jayanta took it 'as the inherence holding, e.g. between a quality and a set of individual quality-bearers' (276). There are actually two problems here. First, what they seem to have in mind is the relation between a universal

(or 'property') and the many particular entities in which that universal inheres (the property-bearers). For a Naiyāyika like Jayanta, this would include not only the relation between cowness and the many individual cows, but also the relation between whiteness and the many individual occurrences of white color. The last of these is the sort of thing that Nyāya means by *guṇa*. The *guṇa*s are what metaphysicians nowadays call 'tropes' or property-particulars, such as the white color that is in this page and only this page. But the relation between a universal (e.g. whiteness) and a trope that is an instance is not the same as the relation between a trope and the substance in which it inheres. Both relations are called by the same name, 'inherence' (*samavāya*). But the white color trope inher*ing* in the substance that is this page is inher*ed* in by whiteness. The point Jayanta is making in the passage they are referring to (*guṇaguṇinoś ceyam eva vṛttiḥ*) is not that a universal can inhere in many distinct individuals, but that inherence holds between two things that are both found at the same place but are nonetheless distinct entities. The white color trope is distinct from the page in which it occurs, even though both are right here. Nyāya, unlike Buddhism, has distinct categories for substance (*dravya*) and trope (*guṇa*).

In their examination of Jayanta's understanding of linguistic meaning, Freschi and Keidan make occasional reference to Frege's distinction between sense (*Sinn*) and reference (*Bedeutung*). It is helpful that the name of Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) comes up in this context, since he is widely regarded as central to the development of modern philosophy of language. The sense-reference distinction is clearly important to Freschi and Keidan's project of acquitting Jayanta (and Indian philosophy of language more generally) of the charge of 'naïve referentialism', the view that linguistic meaning is exhausted in reference. This is valuable. But there is something else in Fregean semantics that might have been of greater value, to Freschi and Keidan's enterprise and to the work as a whole. Frege is famous (or notorious) for having held that an adequate account of linguistic meaning requires the positing of certain 'third-realm' entities, such as propositions. (In Frege's semantics, a proposition is the sense or mode of presentation of a sentence.) These entities are said to be 'third-realm' because Frege thought that while they must be held to exist, they could be neither physical nor mental. The echo of Dharmottara's claim that an *apoha* is 'neither without nor within' is clear. This is not to say that the *apoha* theory anticipates Fregean semantics. For one thing, the Buddhist would condemn the ontological profligacy of Frege's posits. The point is rather that there may be a deep pattern here that is worth exploring. Once we distinguish between the two components of linguistic meaning that Frege labeled 'sense' and 'reference', we are faced with the problem of explaining their relation. Frege's third realm is probably Plato's heaven; Dharmottara's 'neither without nor within' might be

the realm of the conventionally real. Each of the competing ontologies behind these choices of semantic theory has its own difficulties. What may be worth pointing out to those who are skeptical of the value of the sort of philological work on offer here, is how reading Jayanta on *apoha* can help bring to light deep patterns in our theorizing about linguistic meaning. The work presented in this volume is of value to a far wider audience than one might initially suspect.